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How did announcements about the implementation of the Banking Union (BU) in Europe impact 
on financial markets? This paper investigates the effect of the overall bank regulatory reform, 
considering each associated individual announcement, on Credit Default Swaps (CDS), bank stocks 
and stock futures during 2012-14. Announcements related to the implementation of the 
supervisory mechanism, as well as those on the new resolution framework, led to a surge in bank 
CDS spreads, while having a detrimental effect on the wealth of banks’ shareholders. The CDS 
market response to sub-events associated with the ECB’s 2014 Comprehensive Assessment (CA) 
was positive and reflected in a decrease in bank CDS spreads. Furthermore, CDS of Global 
Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) demonstrated a significant reaction to the implementation 
steps in the BU. Banks’ stock prices reacted in a consistent manner with the CDS market. The stock 
futures market did not reveal any strong reaction to the changes in the European regulatory 
landscape. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that bank capitalization is positively associated with 
responses of G-SIBs’ CDS spreads, but is inversely related to responses of CDS spreads for other 
bank groups. Weak underlying credit quality is also a relevant factor in explaining abnormal 
increases in quoted CDS spreads. For the stock market, positive associations of the cumulative 












                                                        
 Corresponding author. E-mail address: livia.pancotto@strath.ac.uk 
 1 
1 Introduction 
“The banking union can only be successful if it delivers an integrated, truly domestic banking 
market for the euro area” (Enria, 2019) 
The European Banking Union (BU) project implies a significant shift of regulatory 
responsibilities from the national to the European level and represents a substantial step forward 
in the process of fostering financial integration and weakening the detrimental feedback loop 
between bank and sovereign risks (Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl, 2014). The first building block, 
a common supervisory framework for the banking system, became effective in November 2014, 
with the European Central Bank (ECB) at the head of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), the second cornerstone, which aims to ensure timely and 
effective resolution of failing banks, was launched in 2015 and became fully operational in January 
2016.1 A European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of the BU, remains a subject 
of debate at the time of writing.2 
 The transition towards BU started with the 12-month Comprehensive Assessment (CA) of 
the euro area banking system. This preliminary financial health check consisted of an Asset Quality 
Review (AQR) and a Stress Test component. The CA was applied to the 130 largest European credit 
institutions, which account for around 82% of the total euro area banking assets. The CA 
commenced in late 2013 and the results were published on 26 October 2014.3 Although the CA was 
mostly considered as a robust and credible exercise, concerns were raised regarding the rigour 
and impartiality. The ECB was forced to choose between a “rock and a hard place”. An overly strict 
assessment, disclosing large capital shortfalls, could have threatened financial stability. In contrast, 
an overly lenient exercise could have undermined the ECB’s credibility. Moreover, the focus on a 
single capital ratio, the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), represented a weakness. On this point, 
Steffen (2014) highlights the issues associated with the adoption of regulatory capital ratios, which 
crucially rely on the assumption that the weights correctly reflect the risk of the underlying asset. 
Also, the non-recognition of the systemic risk arising from linkages and feedback effects between 
banks, as well as the exposures to similar assets and comparable macroeconomic shocks, heavily 
influenced the outcome of the CA.  
 Acharya and Steffen (2014) provide an alternative benchmark methodology to estimate 
capital shortfalls of European banks. Building their approach on publicly available market data, 
they document capital gaps significantly larger than the figures disclosed by the ECB. In their view, 
the results of the regulatory stress test were heavily influenced by the flexibility of national 
                                                        
1 The SRM includes a Single Resolution Board (SRB) and a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and implements the EU-wide 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in the euro area.  
2 In November 2015, the European Commission (EC) proposed a EDIS. The gradual creation of such a scheme might 
imply a temporary “mutualisation” period, through a top-up or reinsurance mechanism, to end in 2024 with a fully-
fledged and common EDIS. 
3 The CA identified an overall capital shortfall of €24.6bn, across 25 credit institutions. Considering the amount of net 
capital raised by the participating banks (starting from end-2013), the capital gap which remained to be addressed was 
€9.5bn, distributed across 13 institutions. 
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regulators in defining and measuring bank capital and by the reliance on risk-weighted assets.4 
The differences between their estimations and the official shortfalls, which are mostly driven by 
large banks in core European countries, i.e. France and Germany, demonstrate the relevance of 
using alternative capital measures, while limiting political influence. Barucci et al. (2018) confirm 
that, in the 2014 CA, a standard leverage ratio was better able to capture banks’ risk than risk-
adjusted measures. Also, these authors provide evidence of a difference in the treatment of banks 
depending on their country of origin, i.e. core versus peripheral countries.   
 Despite the impressive achievement in the (r)evolution of the European banking regulatory 
architecture, there are very few papers focusing on the market reaction to the implementation of 
the BU. Moreover, the prior empirical literature only considers a single step of the overall reform, 
i.e. the CA. Carboni et al. (2017) document a negative stock market reaction on the CA 
announcement date and disclosure of its results, while confirming an increased level of 
transparency arising from the assessment. Their findings also show that, in the short-run, stock 
prices of banks subject to direct ECB supervision had a more pronounced negative reaction, 
compared to those maintaining national supervision. Sahin and de Haan (2016), on a univariate 
basis, report the reaction of financial markets to the CA announcement and the publication of its 
outcomes. The authors find that banks’ stock prices and Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads did not 
react to these events. There is some limited evidence of markets’ responses only when grouping 
banks per country. Barucci et al. (2018), whose research questions and methodology differ from 
ours, provide a thorough analysis of the CA results, while investigating the determinants of banks’ 
capital shortfalls.  
 Subsequent aspects of the regulatory transition have also received relatively little attention 
in terms of academic evidence on the financial market responses. The introduction of the BRRD, 
which is the legal basis of the SRM and is applied to all EU Member States, represented one of the 
most important regulatory changes in Europe during recent years (Constâncio, 2014). Marking the 
end of the culture of bail-out and the beginning of the culture of bail-in, the BRRD foresees a 
minimum set of common rules and procedures for the recovery and resolution of European credit 
institutions and investment firms. From 2016, all bank resolution cases require a bail-in of 
shareholders and creditors equal to at least 8% of the total liabilities of a given bank, including 
own funds.5 Therefore, a bank’s investors, not taxpayers, should bear the costs of bank failures.  
Conlon and Cotter (2014) investigate what might have been the implications of the new European 
resolution framework, and associated bail-in tool, for euro area banks during the global financial 
crisis. Their findings indicate that the existence of a bail-in mechanism would have mainly 
impacted equity and subordinated debt holders of European banks. Depositors would not have 
                                                        
4 A truly consistent definition of capital applied to all the banks supervised by the ECB has been employed since 
November 2014 when the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) was adopted (Véron, 2015).  
5 The ongoing debate on the bail-in of bank liabilities is based around the convergence of two distinct concepts: the Total 
Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC), issued by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Minimum Requirement for Own 
Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL), set in conformity with the BRRD. While both requirements pursue the same 
overall objectives, they differ in terms of scope and features (Berger et al., 2016).  
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been involved in any of their analysed cases, limiting the danger of a potential “flight-to-safety” 
effect and associated risk of contagion. Benczur et al. (2017) explore the effectiveness, in terms of 
impact on public finance costs, of the new EU post-crisis bank regulatory framework. Based on 
their empirical exercise, and in a crisis setting similar to the recent one, the introduction of the 
bail-in mechanism alone results in a reduction in the call for public bail-outs of about 2.3% of EU 
GDP.  
 This paper presents the results of an event study on the impact upon financial markets of 
the implementation of the BU project. Unlike prior evidence mentioned above, which focused 
exclusively on the ECB’s CA (Sahin and de Haan, 2016; Carboni et al., 2017; Barucci et al., 2018), 
and therefore a small number of announcements, the analysis conducted in this paper examines 
the effects of the overall banking reform, inclusive of each intermediate step. By exploiting 17 
official ECB announcements, concerning various aspect of the new regulatory architecture, we 
investigate the impacts on banks’ CDS, stocks and stock futures. A further interest lies in the 
potential heterogeneity in the market reactions across different banks’ sub-groups. The cross-
country comparison, which covers institutions that vary both in terms of bank- and country-
specific characteristics, enables the investigation of how banks located in neighbouring yet 
different banking sectors respond to the introduction of the new rules. Finally, in a multivariate 
framework, we explore to what extent bank-specific characteristics drive heterogeneous reactions.   
 Our research can be positioned within the strand of theoretical studies which address the 
establishment and implementation of the BU (among others, Goyal et al., 2013; Herring, 2013). It 
complements the prior empirical evidence on the implications of the reform and its specific 
components (Conlon and Cotter, 2014; Carboni et al., 2017; Barucci et al., 2018) and extends the 
broader literature that uses event studies to analyse the effects of changes in banking regulation 
(Horváth and Huizinga, 2015; Schäfer et al., 2016; Bruno et al., 2018). Our work differs from the 
most closely related studies, i.e. Carboni et al. (2017) and Barucci et al. (2018), by focusing on the 
entire set of official announcements associated with the BU components, spanning from the launch 
of the project (i.e. September 2012) to November 2014 when the SSM became effective.6 Moreover, 
in a further key contribution of this paper, we address the responses of three different financial 
markets and account for various types of institutions, headquartered in different countries. Finally, 
aimed at explaining the potential drivers of the market reactions, we consider linkages between 
the cross-sectional variation in the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and bank-specific 
characteristics. Revealing the financial market responses to the establishment of the various 
regulatory mechanisms is an essential element to gain an appreciation of the level of credibility of 
the new institutional framework. Credibility and trust are necessary preconditions to the 
                                                        
6 Carboni et al. (2017) focus on only nine events, all of them exclusively related to the CA. By including two further 
official announcements on the CA (i.e. 08/08/14 “ECB publishes Comprehensive Assessment Stress Test Manual” and 
04/09/14 “ECB publishes final list of significant credit institutions”), as well as all of those on the supervisory and 
resolution mechanisms, we extend and complete the list of key dates on the BU. Barucci et al. (2018) employ a different 
empirical methodology and have a narrow interest in the disclosure of the CA results only.  
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realisation of the vision of a complete and effective BU, which ensures the safeness of depositors’ 
funds and prevents the use of taxpayers’ money to foot the bill for bank failures (Gehrig et al., 
2016; Angeloni, 2019).        
 We briefly preview the main findings. The univariate analysis demonstrates that the CDS 
and the stock markets responded in a broadly consistent manner to the information content 
related to BU news releases. The implementation of the supervisory element of the new EU 
institutional framework leads to a surge in bank CDS spreads, while having a detrimental effect on 
stock prices. The CDS market response to the announcements on the CA has been positive, 
meaning that CDS spreads for all the bank groups decreased. Announcements about the new bank 
resolution regime induce higher CDS spreads, which can be attributed to the forthcoming bail-in 
rules. In the stock market, the reaction to events related to the CA is positive and pronounced for 
the majority of the bank groups, having a similar underlying implication as the evidence found for 
the CDS market. The impact of the announcements about the new bank resolution rules is negative 
on all banks’ stocks, but more limited compared to the CDS market. Findings for the stock futures 
market do not highlight any systemic pattern of reactions to the implementation of the new BU 
architecture. This potentially reflects a stronger presence of well-informed participants in the 
derivatives market. 
 The cross-sectional analysis reveals that the level of bank capitalization is positively 
associated with responses of G-SIB’s CDS spreads, but has a negative link with responses of CDS 
spreads for other bank groups. For banks located in non-euro area countries and the G-SIBs, weak 
underlying credit quality is a relevant factor in explaining abnormal increases in CDS premia. Bank 
size does not alter the market participants’ perception of bank riskiness. For the stock market, a 
higher level of capitalization is associated with positive abnormal reactions. Similar evidence holds 
for the stock prices of institutions which are more oriented to traditional lending activities. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 discusses the multivariate analysis. 
Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 provides some robustness checks and Section 7 










2 Hypotheses  
2.1 CDS market reaction 
 Establishing a prior hypothesis for the anticipated direction of the CDS market reaction to 
the new regulatory regime is relatively straightforward compared to the stock and stock futures 
markets. The general aim of the BU project of strengthening the euro-area banking sector might be 
perceived to reduce bank riskiness. The redistribution of the risk between taxpayers, depositors 
and creditors, as a result of the new bail-in rules, together with an enhanced market discipline 
might also contribute to a reduction of the overall risk in the system.7 Thanks to the bail-in powers 
and to an increased transparency, funding costs would better reflect the banking risk improving 
the overall financial stability (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2018). Therefore, a decrease in banks’ CDS spreads 
would be expected, given their inherent nature as risk indicators.  
 The bail-in mechanism for dealing with ailing banks, which refers to the re-capitalization of 
the institutions via the compulsory write-down of liabilities or the conversion of debt into equity, 
is an underlying feature of both the BRRD and the SRM (Conlon and Cotter, 2014). The bail-in basis 
spans from junior to senior unsecured debt, also including uninsured customer deposits which 
exceed €100,000. When considering this new bail-in philosophy, a reduction in bail-out 
expectations across banks would be expected with a consequent increase in credit risk premia. 
This would be in turn reflected in a rise in CDS spreads, linked to an increased perception of 
banking default risk.8 This evidence contrasts with the pre bail-in period (especially during 2008-
09), when bank bailouts were associated with decreasing bank CDS spreads (Ejsing and Lemke, 
2011).  
 Furthermore, different types of banks, as well as banks located in different countries, might 
show different price reactions to the selected announcements. G-SIBs, for instance, are expected to 
experience a larger reduction in bailout expectations and, thus, a more pronounced CDS market 
reaction than smaller banks for events associated with the new resolution regime. The new bail-in 
rules should in principle affect more those institutions that in the past would have most benefited 
from an implicit public subsidy (Leonello, 2018). Also, within this category, it should impact the 
riskiest banks the most. A similar consideration would hold for banks located in peripheral euro 
area countries, particularly affected by the sovereign debt crisis and with high levels of public debt. 
As naturally in a different position compared to their peers, market reactions of banks located 
outside the euro area are expected to be less strong than those of banks situated in euro area 
economies. 
                                                        
7 The removal of implicit guarantees should increase the effort of debt-holders in monitoring banks, therefore mitigating 
moral hazard issues. This, in turn, should reduce the CDS spreads (IMF, 2014).  
8 As a consequence of the increased level of risk, holders of bail-in liabilities might be expected to require a higher return, 
all else being equal.  
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2.2 Stock and stock futures market reactions 
 Stigler (1971) proposes that regulatory reforms provide opportunities to expropriate 
wealth from competitor groups (“capture theory”). Another prominent viewpoint, the “public-
interest” hypothesis, is that regulation serves the public interest to enhance social welfare at the 
expense of the regulated industry (Needham, 1983).9 It is plausible to conceive how this paper’s 
analysis would fit under this viewpoint i.e. increasing the stability and the solvency of the 
European banking system would serve the public interest.  
 Influential work by Schwert (1981) argues that investors seek to identify regulation that 
might lead to increased asset prices while discouraging regulation that decreases asset prices. 
Therefore, they tend to sell the stocks of firms for which regulatory changes are detrimental and 
buy the stocks of firms that might benefit from these changes. In this sense, expectations are 
fundamental and play a crucial role in influencing investors’ decisions. Changes in regulation might 
lead investors to modify their beliefs about expected returns, thereby affecting their propensity to 
hold stocks, e.g. bank equity in the context of this paper. In the worst scenario, this could result 
into a general investors’ aversion towards funding banks and this might have consequent systemic 
repercussions (Bruno et al., 2018).    
 The overall impact of the implementation of BU on bank shareholders is not clear a priori. 
An appreciation in stock prices might be expected if the new regulatory framework is perceived as 
influential in improving banks’ stability without having excessive negative impacts on their 
profitability. By lowering potential systemic risk and contagion (a notable feature of the European 
sovereign debt crisis), the new regulation might entail positive shareholder wealth effects. 
Moreover, stock prices might also react positively due to the perceived benefits of a convergence 
towards a common set of rules applied at European level (i.e. “level playing field”).  
 When considering the ECB’s CA, which represented the entry point to the first pillar of BU 
(i.e. the SSM), a potential adverse market reaction might be anticipated due to the impact of the 
procedure on the banking sector’s profitability. In this regard, additional capital associated with 
extra provisioning, as a consequence of the asset re-evaluation, might be expected to negatively 
impact banks’ ROE and their stock prices (Schäfer et al., 2016). The underlying assumption would 
be that equity capital for banks is perceived to be more expensive than debt, due to the tax 
deductibility of interest and the presence of implicit subsidies (Moenninghoff et al., 2015). Under 
this view, because of the potential increase in funding costs, the impact would be expected to be 
stronger for both the group of G-SIBs and that of credit institutions located in euro area peripheral 
countries (GIIPS countries). Additionally, more stringent but still not completely transparent new 
rules on failing banks, could lead to a potential negative reaction in the stock market.10 Finally, 
                                                        
9 When unanticipated changes in regulation occur, the capture theory would generally predict positive ARs, while the 
public interest theory would predict the opposite. 
10 Differences in the implementation of the BBRD at national levels, with respect to bail-in hierarchies, might increase 
uncertainty in the stock market. From this perspective, the 2015 cases of the Portuguese Banco Novo and the four Italian 
regional banks (i.e. Banca Etruria, Banca Marche, CariFerrara and CariChieti) are significant.    
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similarly to the CDS market, the market impact on institutions based in non-euro area countries 
would be expected to be less pronounced than that observed for banks located in the euro area 
countries. Nevertheless, due to a potential competitive advantage, a neutral or positive market 
reaction would be expected. Table 1 summarizes, for the CDS, stock and stock futures markets, the 
stated hypotheses regarding the expected reactions to the selected key announcements related to 
the BU.  
 Beyond the analysis of the stock market reaction, it is plausible that different or stronger 
reactions could be observed in the stock futures market. In perfectly frictionless, complete and 
rational markets, prices of stocks and their corresponding derivatives would be anticipated to 
simultaneously incorporate new information. However, a common view in the literature is that 
derivatives can potentially react differently or more quickly (e.g. Back, 1993). This is attributed to 
a preference of sophisticated and well-informed participants to trade in derivatives at times of 
information arrival. This can be induced by leverage in derivatives, alongside funding constraints, 
transaction costs, short-selling restrictions and constraints on borrowing securities in the stock 
market (e.g. Black, 1975).  While the empirical evidence is mixed, many findings indicate a strong 
role for stock futures in the price discovery process (e.g. Aggarwal and Thomas, 2019; Jain et al., 
2019). In contrast, the activity of informed traders in futures markets could be deterred by noise 
trader risk during specific periods characterised by sentiment-based factors (e.g. Lin et al., 2018). 
Therefore, it is a worthwhile empirical exercise for this paper to consider stock futures alongside 
the stock and CDS markets. 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
 The initial sample comprises the European banks subject to the ECB’s 2014 CA. After 
thorough investigation of data sources, the original sample of 130 institutions was reduced due to 
data availability and other quality and/or liquidity constraints. Specifically, the largest sample, 
which is for the stock market analysis, includes 50 banks from 19 European countries, comprising 
those that are publicly listed and with liquid traded stocks. The CDS market analysis is conducted 
on a sub-sample of 33 credit institutions due to data availability, while the sample for the stock 
futures includes 24 banks (Table 2).11  
 Daily CDS quotes on senior 5-year debt contracts (with a modified-modified restructuring 
clause) are employed, because these are the most liquid and are widely adopted in the academic 
literature (e.g. Horváth and Huizinga, 2015; Schäfer et al., 2016; Sclip et al., 2019). For the stock 
and stock futures markets, daily closing prices are used. The reference currency is the Euro for all 
market prices. For institutions located outside the euro area, prices are converted to Euros when 
                                                        
11 The applied liquidity criterion, applied for the three markets, was to retain only entities for which returns/spread 
changes were non-zero in over 50% of the observations. This led to the exclusion of two Cypriot banks and one bank 
from Malta. Another four banks (one each from Austria, Germany, Poland and Slovakia, respectively) were also excluded 
from the analysis, in a previous step, due to data inconsistency.  
 8 
necessary. Data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream for the period from 1 June 2011 
to 30 November 2014. The data spans beyond the time around the considered announcements in 
order to estimate the expected returns.  
The empirical analysis is also conducted on multiple bank sub-groups. Investigating these 
different sub-samples provides scope to capture the potential heterogeneity of reactions across 
different groups of banks. The four sub-samples consist of banks which are (i) located in euro area 
countries (“EU_EZ”); (ii) located in euro area peripheral countries (“GIIPS” countries); (iii) 
headquartered in European but non-euro area countries (“EU_NONEZ”); (v) classified as G-SIBs.  
3.2 Event dates  
 The initial set of event dates is defined by all the ECB’s press releases on the BU project for 
the period spanning from the launch of the project (i.e. autumn 2012) to the starting date of the 
SSM, i.e. 4 November 2014. Elements of the regulatory reform are revealed over a period of around 
three years. Therefore, in order to correctly interpret and appreciate the effect of its 
implementation, it is fundamental to assess the informational content of each associated sub-event. 
Considering only ECB official announcements (an approach which is consistent with Petrella and 
Resti, 2013; Carboni et al., 2017 and Bruno et al., 2018) led to the identification of a set of 25 event 
dates. To better investigate the extent to which these official announcements conveyed relevant 
information to the financial markets, detailed research on the related media coverage was 
performed, resulting in the selection of 17 key events. Eight of these events are associated with the 
CA, seven with the banking supervision component and two with the bank resolution framework.12 
Finally, a cross-sectional check to rule out the presence of significant confounding events was 
conducted using LexisNexis. Table 3 reports the relevant event dates included in the analysis.  
3.3 Empirical methodology  
 The event study approach is well-designed to investigate the valuation effects of regulatory 
reforms. We opt for this methodology because the new banking rules are gradually implemented 
over some years starting from 2012 and an examination of their long-term impact on banks’ 
behaviours would require a much longer time-frame. Combining accounting and market data 
represents an effective strategy to test how market participants evaluate the newly established 
mechanisms.  
 Moreover, the analysis of the impact of changes in regulation by means of event studies has 
been very widely applied in the banking literature and we highlight some recent examples here. 
Veronesi and Zingales (2010) investigate the effect of the 2008 Paulson Plan on the value of US 
banks. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) examine the effects on US financial institutions of the 
government capital injections under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Norden et al. 
(2013) investigate the impact on stock market performance of corporate borrowers arising from 
                                                        
12 This search was conducted using the online Financial Times-EU edition and the websites of Reuters and Bloomberg. 
Eight announcements were removed from the original 25 because they were mainly related to the nomination of the 
Supervisory Board’s members and its composition. 
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government interventions in the US banking industry during the 2007-financial crisis. Horváth and 
Huizinga (2015) analyse the reaction in euro area financial markets to the single announcement on 
the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in 2010. Moenninghoff et al. (2015) 
explore the stock price reactions of large banks to the 2009 additional regulation on G-SIBs. 
Schäfer et al. (2016) investigate the reactions of European and US financial markets to major 
regulatory reforms during 2009-11. Bruno et al. (2018) evaluate the stock market reactions of 
European banks to announcements on liquidity regulation under the Basel III framework. 
 In the first step of the event study, the abnormal return (AR) of a financial asset is 
estimated as the difference between the actual (ex post) return and the expected (ex ante) return, 
over the selected event window.13 Expected or normal return estimations are obtained through the 
market model specified as follows: 
Equation 1 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     14  
with        𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0      𝑉𝐴𝑅[𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 𝜎
2 
 and where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily asset return of bank i at time t, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
is the zero mean error term. Market model parameters, i.e.  𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖 and 𝜎
2, are estimated by OLS 
over a 255-day estimation window ending 20 days before the announcement date. For CDS, 
absolute spread changes (as in Hull et al., 2004 and Norden and Weber, 2004) are calculated, while 
for stocks and stock futures, log returns are computed. The ITRAXX Europe Senior Financial 5Y 
Index (sourced from Bloomberg), the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index and the Eurex Euro STOXX 
Banks Index Futures (sourced from Datastream) are employed as the proxies for the CDS, stock 
and stock futures market portfolios, respectively.  
 The ARs are obtained as the difference between the actual returns and the estimated 
values, unconditional on the events, predicted by the market model: 
Equation 2 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼?̂? − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡) 
 Negative abnormal changes in CDS spreads reflect a decrease in the market’s perception of 
bank riskiness, while positive abnormal CDS spreads imply the reverse. Negative ARs for stock 
prices and stock futures indicate “abnormal” drops following an event, and vice versa. 
 The ARs are then aggregated over the relevant event window around the announcement 
date 𝑡 = 0, in order to obtain the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs), and to compute the 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) as the mean of the CAR estimates for each event.  
                                                        
13 ARs relate to the analysis for stock and stock futures markets, whereas abnormal spreads apply for the CDS market. In 
the remainder of the paper, the terminology for the analysis on the CDS market also refers to ARs. 
14 The corresponding measure of the abnormal spread changes in the CDS market is given by the following formula: 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖∆𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . This approach is consistent with e.g. Norden and Weber (2004), Morgan et al. (2014), 
Sahin and de Haan (2016). 
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Equation 3 





𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 (𝑡1, 𝑡2) =  
1
𝑁




 The focus is on a symmetric 3-day event window (-1, +1) to capture effects that can 
potentially occur after the markets close, as well as leakage and lag effects. Employing a short 
event window mitigates the impact of potentially confounding effects, whose influence usually 
increases with a wider event window. For robustness, the univariate analysis on the CDS and stock 
markets is also conducted on a 1-day event window (see Section 6). Finally, to test whether the 
CAARs significantly differ from zero (i.e. 𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 0), both non-parametric and parametric tests 
are employed to improve the reliability of inferences. To simultaneously account for cross-
sectional correlation in the residuals and event clustering, the adjusted version of the Boehmer et 
al. (1991) test, proposed by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010), is employed. As a non-parametric test 
statistic, the generalized sign test by Cowan (1992) is used, which accounts for the proportional 
distribution of positive against negative abnormal returns.15  
4 Multivariate analysis  
 This second aspect of the analysis focuses on the extent to which bank-specific factors 
could potentially amplify or mitigate the financial market responses to the selected regulatory 
events. The investigation of the cross-sectional determinants of CARs using a 2-stage approach is 
common in the banking literature (e.g. Moenninghoff et al., 2015; Carboni et al., 2017; Bruno et al., 
2018). 16  Therefore, in the following multivariate analysis, we employ various bank-level 
explanatory variables (Table 4) with the aim of explaining any heterogeneity in the bank CARs.17  
 Except for the bank size indicator, which is measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets (measured in million Euros), all other variables are ratios. These are constructed from 
banks’ balance sheet information, on an annual basis, obtained from the BankScope database for 
                                                        
15 The use of the event study methodology is not without limitations. Identifying the precise event date might represent a 
challenge, which we have dealt with by selecting only ECB official announcements and employing a 3-day event window 
centred on the announcement day. This approach also alleviates any prior market anticipation of an information arrival. 
The use of the adjusted BMP test accounts for potential biases arising from employing the same set of event dates for 
firms from the same industry. Using a non-parametric significance test provides further robustness to the findings.   
16 As discussed in seminal contributions by MacKinlay (1997) and Binder (1998), the cross-sectional regression 
approach is a standard practice in the event study methodology and represents an appropriate tool to explore the 
association between the estimated CARs and firm-specific characteristics. However, we recognise that some limitations 
exist with this approach. The use of CARs as the dependent variable in the regression approach might raise some 
concerns in terms of behaviour of the residuals and efficiency of the estimates. However, Karafiath (1994) and 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) directly address this matter and they argue that using the OLS estimator with a 
heteroscedasticity correction is appropriate and any potential benefit of using more complex procedures is modest. 
17 In the interests of brevity and due to the similarities between the stock and stock futures markets, we limit the 
tabulated multivariate results to the CDS and stock markets. Also, the motivation to include the stock futures analysis 
was based on price discovery and information arrival rather than cross-sectional aspects. 
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the period 2012-14. The CET1 ratio data are gathered from SNL Financial. Due attention is given to 
potential multicollinearity among explanatory variables. For this reason, capital explanatory 
variables (i.e. TIER1_RATIO, CET1 and LEVERAGE_T) are selected separately as alternatives.18 
Moreover, to deal with the presence of potential outliers, all bank-level explanatory variables, as 
well as the dependent variable, are winsorized at 1% in each tail of the distribution (in line with 
Armour et al., 2017; Bruno et al., 2018 and many others). Table 5 reports the main descriptive 
statistics on the variables employed in the regression analysis.  
4.1 Can bank-specific features influence financial markets’ reactions? 
 The immediate reactions of financial markets to the various announcements on the BU, 
spanning from September 2012 to November 2014, might have been conditioned by differences at 
the bank level.  
 In relation to the CDS market, the core function of bank capital in absorbing unexpected 
losses and preventing potential insolvency should be of primary importance. Well-capitalized 
banks, with their associated lower probability of default, are expected to demonstrate less 
evidence of abnormal CDS reactions than those which are less capitalized (Chiaramonte and Casu, 
2013; Sclip et al., 2019). Moreover, under-capitalized institutions might have more incentives to 
adopt excess risk-taking behaviour (Acharya and Steffen, 2015).  
 Better-capitalized institutions are expected to experience a neutral or positive stock 
market reaction to the new regulatory framework. Nevertheless, differences in the results might 
emerge if considering standard leverage (i.e. equity to assets ratio) rather than risk-weighted 
capital ratios (i.e. TIER1 ratio and CET1 ratio). Acharya and Steffen (2014) argue that the amount 
of bank capital shortfall found under the ECB’s 2014 CA was around twenty times larger than 
reported. In their view, that underestimation is due to the adoption of inadequate measures of 
banks’ capital ratios, based on regulatory risk-weights.19Barucci et al. (2018) confirm the 
superiority of a standard leverage measure over risk-adjusted ratios in reflecting banks’ risk.   
 Alongside capital holdings, bank liquidity represents a crucial and complementary element 
in promoting the resilience and soundness of the banking sector. A bank which is unable to roll 
over maturing debt can fail despite being solvent. When considering the bank CDS market, more 
liquid institutions are expected to reveal a smaller reaction than less liquid ones. Neutral or 
positive stock price reactions are expected for more liquid banks in response to the 
implementation of the BU because they are perceived safer compared to less liquid institutions.  
The presence of a high volume of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) on a bank’s balance sheet 
adversely impacts its profitability because increased provisions are required, which in turn lower 
                                                        
18 Pairwise correlation coefficients between the variables are not reported, but we note that any pairs of variables 
revealing a correlation coefficient above 0.7 are excluded from use in the same model specification. Although the 
correlation coefficients for TIER1_RATIO and LEVERAGE_T do not pose any concerns in terms of potential 
multicollinearity, the variables are still considered separately as alternatives. Justification is provided in Section 4.1. 
19 The ECB approach in assessing capital requirements is heavily dependent on the regulatory capital ratios established 
under the Basel accords (Acharya, Engle and Pierret, 2014). 
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the net income. Impaired assets might also constrain significant amounts of capital due to the 
associated higher risk-weights, as well as hampering banks’ capacity to provide new lending. 
Deterioration in asset quality also affects banks’ funding costs, thus increasing investors’ risk 
perception. NPLs for European banks were estimated to value about €1 trillion at June 2015, 
equivalent to 7.3% of the EU’s GDP (EBA, 2015). The highest levels of NPLs were evidently in 
southern euro area countries. Since high volumes of NPLs place a huge burden on banks’ balance 
sheets, and low-quality loan portfolios influence the probability of default, the proxy for the asset 
quality is expected to have a negative and sizeable influence on the CDS market response to the 
implementation of the BU. Stock prices of credit institutions characterized by high levels of NPLs 
are expected to react negatively to the implementation of the new European regulatory 
framework.  
 Larger credit institutions, with cross-country activities, pose a greater risk at the systemic 
level and are a target group for the new regulatory regime. These banks are expected to 
demonstrate an abnormal increase in their CDS premia, while revealing a negative stock market 
reaction to the regulatory implementation. Stock prices of banks characterized by sufficiently 
stable funding sources (thus having a reduced level of maturity mismatch) are expected to react 
less than those of institutions with more volatile funding structures. A higher reliance on short-
term liabilities is harmful for banks’ stability. Similarly, banks which are more oriented to 
traditional intermediation, with an adequate level of asset diversification and with less risk 
appetite, are expected to demonstrate less pronounced abnormal increases in CDS premia (and a 
relatively benign stock market reaction) compared with riskier counterparties. Lastly, banks with 
the capability to generate and/or maintain greater profitability are expected to reveal smaller 
abnormal reactions in the CDS market. More profitable institutions might reveal positive ARs in the 
stock market compared to less profitable competitors. 
4.2  Regression model  
 We regress the CARs arising from the univariate investigation on the selected bank-specific 
variables. The baseline empirical model, adopted for the analysis on both the CDS and stock 
markets, is represented by the following equation: 
Equation 5 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛽1(𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅1) +  𝛽2(𝑁𝑃𝐿) + 𝛽3 (𝑇𝐴) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝑇_𝐹) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁_𝑇𝐴) + 𝛽6(𝐼𝑁𝑇)
+ 𝛽7(𝑁_𝐼𝑁𝑇) + 𝛽8(𝑅𝑊𝐴_𝑇𝐴) + 𝛾(𝐸𝑉) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 of bank i is calculated over a 3-day event window. TIER1 is the ratio of tier1 
capital to risk-weighted assets (proxy for capitalization). NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans 
to gross loans (proxy for asset quality). TA is the natural logarithm of total assets (proxy for bank 
size). ST_F is the ratio of deposits and short-term funding to total assets (proxy for funding 
structure). LOAN_TA is the ratio of net loans to total assets (proxy for business model). INT is the 
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ratio of interest income to average earning assets (proxy for profitability). N_INT is the ratio of 
non-interest income to gross revenues (proxy for diversification). RWA_TA is the ratio of risk-
weighted assets to total assets (proxy for ex-ante risk taking). EV is a vector of dummies for the 
selected 17 announcement dates. Regressions with bank fixed effects are run for the whole sample 
of banks and sub-groups. Robust standard errors are clustered at bank-year level (Petersen, 2009; 
Thompson, 2011). 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 Univariate analysis 
5.1.1 CDS market: Reaction to key BU announcement dates 
 Table 6 reports the CAARs for the entire sample and banks’ sub-groups. In order to provide 
an overview of the market reactions associated with the announcements on a common theme, 
Table 7 displays the aggregate coefficients. The figures in both Panels A and B of Table 7 are the 
outcomes of an aggregation across events of the same nature (i.e. “supervision”, “Comprehensive 
Assessment”, “resolution”).  
 Considering only the statistically significant coefficients (Panel B of Table 7), all the sub-
groups demonstrate positive CAARs for the seven announcements related to the new supervisory 
framework. The relatively large value (+7.17bps) reported for the G-SIBs might be associated with 
the prospect of more demanding and intensive oversight. Negative aggregate CAARs (especially 
pronounced for GIIPS and G-SIBs) associated with the eight sub-events relating to the ECB’s CA are 
likely to reflect the beneficial effect of the CA in enhancing transparency and soundness of the 
European banking sector. Referring to Table 6, while an increase in bank CDS spreads is reported 
for the CA announcement on 23 October 2013, further clarification and disclosure of more 
information on the procedure proved to be highly informative to the market and contributed to 
lowering the risk associated with banking activity. The fourth, fifth and sixth ECB announcements 
on the CA (i.e. 29 April 2014, 17 July 2014 and 8 August 2014) are found to convey valuable 
information to the market, with investors perceiving lower bank default risk.20 An abnormal drop 
in CDS spreads is associated with the disclosure of the CA results on 27 October 2014, which is 
particularly pronounced for banks headquartered in GIIPS countries (-4.89pbs). These findings 
provide support to the view that the CA provided new information to the CDS market, while 
promoting greater financial stability.   
 Regarding the resolution announcements (events 5 and 9), the aggregate significant CAARs 
are positive for all groups of banks (Table 7, Panel B). The negative and significant CAARs 
associated with the initial formal announcement on the SRM are offset by the large positive 
coefficients for the second announcement on 20 March 2014. This evidence might be attributable 
                                                        
20 The announcements relate to the (i) ECB position on the way to address bank capital shortfalls resulting from the CA, 
(ii) the release of the template to disclose the results and (iii) the publication of the CA and stress test manual (refer to 
Table 3).  
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to an unclear and preliminary framework for the new bank resolution procedures. Indeed, while 
bank CDS spreads declined in reaction to the first announcement, sovereign CDS spreads strongly 
increased (particularly for GIIPS countries).21 This could imply that, in the short-term, the market 
perception of possible government bail-outs for distressed banks was still strong and dependent 
on the specific countries’ fiscal conditions. Narrowing the discussion on the coefficients associated 
with the announcement number 9, which is considered as a milestone of the new bank resolution 
regime, they are positive and highly significant for each bank sub-groups (Table 6). An increase in 
the perceived level of banks’ riskiness, as a consequence of the bail-in philosophy implied in the 
new resolution rules, could have been reflected in higher associated CDS spreads. The latter 
evidence, moreover, seems to be particularly significant for the group of G-SIBs (+7.43bps), which 
have been perceived to benefit from explicit and implicit government guarantees over a lengthy 
earlier time period (Moenninghoff et al., 2015; Leonello, 2018).22   
5.1.2 Stock and stock futures markets: Reactions to key BU announcement dates 
  Table 8 reports in detail the CAARs for the entire sample and the banks’ sub-groups. 
Following the same approach as for the CDS market, Table 9 displays the aggregate CAARs, 
classified according to the nature of the ECB official announcements.  
 The univariate analysis on the stock market produces results which mirror (and therefore 
support) the findings for the CDS market. The whole sample reveals negative CAARs for the seven 
announcements related to the single supervisory regime (-1.49%), positive CAARs across the eight 
announcements related to the CA (+6.96%) and negative aggregate coefficients in association with 
the two announcements on the new bank resolution regime (-2.04%). If one considers only the 
statistically significant coefficients (Panel B of Table 9), the corresponding figures become -3.01% 
(supervision events n. 2, 10 and 16), +7.80% (CA events n. 4, 8 and 14) and -1.10% (resolution 
event n. 5).  
 With respect to the implementation of the single supervisory architecture, investors in the 
stock market, rather than rewarding the convergence towards a common supervisory culture, 
seem more concerned by the prospect of a more intrusive and costly regime. The initial positive 
sentiment recorded upon Mario Draghi welcoming the agreement on the SSM, in September 2013, 
was followed by a significant negative reaction to the announcement on the regulation on the 
supervisory fees (i.e. event n.16, 30 October 2014).23 Angeloni (2018) and Bruno and Carletti 
(2019) highlight the necessity to reduce the complexity and costs of the current multi-structured 
supervisory framework.  
                                                        
21 Although not presented in this version of the paper, we also investigated the sovereign CDS market response to the key 
BU announcements. 
22 Similar findings arise from the analysis conducted on a 1-day event window. On 20 March 2014, the estimated 
coefficient for the group of G-SIBs is +9.60bps, significant at the 1% level according to both the parametric and non-
parametric significance tests (refer to Section 6 and Table 14).  
23 At the bank level, fees are calculated on the basis of the importance and the risk profile of the supervised entity. Since 
markets’ response to regulatory events depends on both the costs and benefits associated with the new proposed rules, 
the interpretation of the reactions broadly relies on how markets evaluate these costs and benefits (Gao et al., 2018).  
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 The stock market reaction is shown to promote the effectiveness of the CA in shedding 
more light on the euro area banking sector. Positive reactions are noteworthy for the events n. 8 
and 14, and more pronounced for the sub-group of banks located in GIIPS countries (+13.27% and 
+2.67%, respectively). The enhanced transparency is reflected in increasing bank stock prices. This 
positive outcome has been potentially enlarged by the fact that several banks improved their 
capital position ahead of the CA, with consequent beneficial effects for the stability of the entire 
system. Differing from Carboni et al. (2017), but consistent with Sahin and de Haan (2016), bank 
stock prices of all sub-groups do not significantly react on the day associated with the disclosure of 
the CA results (event n.15). 24 Finally, negative market responses are associated with the two 
announcements on the bank resolution regime. Nevertheless, only the coefficients associated with 
the first announcement (i.e. event n. 5) present some marginal statistical significance, with the 
euro area banks showing the strongest reaction (-1.29%).   
 As anticipated, the sub-group including banks located in European but non-euro area 
countries demonstrates a different outcome to the other bank groups. It reveals positive significant 
CAARs (+1.90%) for the seven announcements related to the supervision regime and nearly close 
to zero CAARs related to the eight announcements on the CA (+0.17%). The coefficients associated 
with the two announcements on the resolution framework are both insignificant. The positive 
response to the implementation of the common supervision seems to suggest a competitive 
advantage, at least in the short-term, for the institutions outside the euro area. Lastly, contrary to a 
prior expectation, it is noteworthy that G-SIBs demonstrate small and insignificant CAARs across 
all the 17 selected announcements.  
 The evidence found for the stock futures market is mixed. The investors’ responses to the 
various announcements on the single supervisory framework are positive for all the considered 
bank groups (Table 11, Panel B). The most pronounced reaction is recorded for banks in GIIPS 
countries (+2.49%). This evidence contrasts with the findings for the stock market, suggesting a 
different perception among participants in the derivatives market regarding the beneficial effects 
of the convergence towards common supervisory rules. Positive and significant coefficients are 
shown in correspondence to the third and seventh announcement on the SSM (Table 10). When 
considering the announcements on the CA, the direction of the market reaction is overall aligned 
with that found for the stock market (Table 11, Panel A). Nevertheless, when looking only at the 
significant coefficients (Table 11, Panel B), the responsiveness of the stock futures market is very 
limited. The same consideration holds when focusing on the announcements on the new bank 
resolution rules. Although, at least in principle closely related to the stock market, movements in 
the derivatives market do not highlight any particular sensitivity to the implementation of the new 
mechanisms within the BU architecture. This can potentially reflect the better informed 
                                                        
24 This finding is also consistent when using a different proxy for the stock market (i.e. MSCI Europe Index) and when 
focusing on a 1-day event window (refer to Section 6 on the robustness checks).  
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constituency in the futures market, in the sense that there is less “surprise” content in the 
announcements. Such evidence is an important additional contribution of this paper.    
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
5.2.1 CDS market regression results 
 The estimated results for the regression analysis on both the entire sample of banks as well 
as each sub-group are reported in Table 12. The findings suggest that, as anticipated, the level of 
capitalization (captured by the TIER1_RATIO variable) has an inverse link with the dependent 
variable (CARs). Nevertheless, the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. For the G-
SIBs, the positive and statistically significant coefficient could arise because market participants 
associate a higher riskiness to increasing levels of capital, due to these banks’ systemic relevance. 
Moreover, “forcing banks to raise expensive capital because future profitability is unclear increases 
the probability of future non-viability” (Financial Times, 2016).25 When considering the top-quality 
capital, the CET1 ratio, the associated coefficient for the G-SIBs, although still positive, is not 
significant, while for the sub-group of banks situated in GIIPS countries the ratio has a negative and 
significant coefficient (-1.711 significant at the 5% level).26   
  Contrary to prior expectations, the coefficient for the proxy of the loan portfolio quality, i.e. 
NPL, is negative (although small) and insignificant for the largest groups of banks (full sample, 
banks located in euro area countries and credit institutions operating in peripheral euro area 
economies). However, it is positive and significant for the remaining two sub-groups. A coefficient 
of 1.100, significant at the 5% level, is obtained for banks located in non-euro area countries, while 
for the G-SIBs a one percentage point increase in the NPL ratio is associated with an (abnormal) 
increase in the CDS spreads of around 3bps. For these two sub-groups, underlying weak credit 
quality seems to be a relevant factor in explaining abnormal movements (increases) in CDS 
spreads. The latter evidence holds also in the model specification including the CET1 as an 
alternative proxy for bank capitalization.  
 Abnormal changes in CDS premia are not sensitive to the bank’s size (captured by the level 
of total assets). This evidence could depend on the perceived lack of proportionality in the new 
European banking framework. The proxy for the funding structure, given by the amount of 
deposits and short-term funding over the total assets, yields positive coefficients for four out of 
five sub-groups of banks, although statistically different from zero only for the full sample (0.272, 
significant at the 5% level). For the G-SIBs, the coefficient has a negative sign (-0.355) and is 
significant at the 5% level. In this case, a greater reliance on short-term funding and, thus, a higher 
level of liquidity seems to contribute in lowering the probability of potential distress, which is in 
turn reflected in lower CDS spreads. 
                                                        
25 See www.ft.com/content/058b4ee0-d0c9-11e5-831d-09f7778e7377.  
26 When considering the standard leverage ratio none of the estimated coefficients is significant. These results are not 
tabulated in the current version of the paper.  
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 The net loans to total asset ratio (indicating the business model orientation), has a negative 
and significant coefficient of 0.362 in the regression for the full sample. The coefficient is negative, 
although insignificant, for the sub-sample of banks located in euro area countries. In the remaining 
cases, the sign is positive but insignificant. In contrast to this mixed evidence, when including the 
CET1 as the proxy for bank capitalization, a negative and significant relationship between euro 
area banks’ business model orientation and CDS spreads changes is revealed.  
 The estimated coefficients for bank profitability (defined as the ratio of interest income 
over average earning assets) have the predicted negative relationship with CARs for the sub-
groups of (i) banks located in GIIPS countries (-3.687); (ii) G-SIBs (-3.010); and (iii) banks located 
outside euro area countries (-3.914). Nevertheless, it is only for the latter category that the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. The profitability indicator for GIIPS banks 
turns statistically significant at the 1% level in the model specification including the CET1. 
Consistent with initial expectations, when significant, banks’ perceived probability of distress 
increases with lower levels of profitability.   
 The degree of diversification in banking activities, captured by the ratio of non-interest 
income to gross revenues, has a positive association with CARs in the CDS market for the main 
bank sub-groups (ALL, EU_EZ and GIIPS). The estimated coefficient is marginally significant only 
for the group of banks located in peripheral economies (0.310 and significant at the 10% level). 
This positive relation suggests that a higher reliance on non-interest income might be perceived as 
a factor which contributes in increasing a bank’s riskiness, reflected in higher CDS spreads. For the 
group of banks located outside the euro area (EU_NONEZ) and G-SIBs, the relation is instead 
negative and highly significant (the coefficients are -0.097 and -0.475, respectively). In line with 
the prior literature, it is not clear whether a more diversified income structure and, specifically, the 
reliance on the non-interest component, has a beneficial impact in lowering banking default risk 
(see, among others, Altunbas et al., 2017).   
 Finally, the ratio of risk-weighted assets over total assets, which represents the proxy for 
the ex-ante risk taking, demonstrates a mixed and marginal effect on the level of CDS spreads. It 
has negative coefficients for the whole sample and the sub-group of banks located outside the euro 
area, although marginally significant only in the latter case (-0.070 significant at the 10% level). 
Otherwise it yields positive coefficients, significant only for the sub-sample located in peripheral 
countries (0.239 and significant at the 10% level).  
5.2.2 Stock market regression results 
 For the full sample of banks, the TIER1_RATIO yields a positive coefficient of 0.200 that is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (Table 13). In the case of institutions located in euro area 
countries (EU_EZ) the coefficient remains positive and highly significant (at the 1% level). A higher 
level of capitalization is associated with positive abnormal performance in the stock market. This 
seems especially true in the case of euro area banks, for which a one percentage point increase in 
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the TIER1 ratio is associated with an (abnormal) increase in the stock prices of around 0.38%. 
Similar results, showing stronger statistical significance, are also obtained when considering a 
standard non-risk based leverage measure (i.e. the assets to equity ratio). The stock market 
reaction of banks located in euro area countries is positively affected by their level of capitalization 
(on average significant at the 5% level). In contrast, the level of capitalization has a negative 
coefficient for both banks located outside euro area countries and G-SIBs, which is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The outcomes obtained when using the CET1 ratio demonstrate a sign 
consistent with the other two cases.27 
 The coefficient on the proxy variable for credit quality (i.e. NPL) is generally negative and 
insignificant, except for the G-SIBs sub-group for which it assumes a positive and highly significant 
value (0.667). This might be interpreted as a sign of positive sentiment by the market participants 
towards the credibility of the new regulatory framework in strengthening the resilience of these 
banks by pressing them to resolve the NPL situation. It is worthwhile to mention the substantial 
efforts of the SSM in tackling the NPL problem within the European banking sector.    
 The level of total assets (bank size) has a mixed impact on the stock market responses. The 
estimated coefficient is negative in the regressions for (i) the full sample; (ii) the sub-group of 
banks located in GIIPS countries; and (iii) banks in non-euro area countries. Nevertheless, the 
coefficient (-5.595) is only significant in the latter case (at the 5% level). This might imply that 
shareholders of large institutions outside the scope of the BU are sensitive to potential 
disadvantages of their absence from the new centralised banking framework. For the remaining 
sub-groups, the coefficient is positive and, in the case of G-SIBs, pronounced although not 
statistically significant.  
 The proxy for the funding structure, defined as the ratio of deposits and short term funding 
to total assets, reveals relatively weak and not significant coefficients in all the regressions. The net 
loans to total assets ratio, indicating the business model orientation, is positively associated with 
banks’ stock price reaction. The largest coefficient (0.595), which is statistically significant at the 
1% level, is obtained for the G-SIBs. Stock prices of banks with business models more orientated to 
traditional activities, since potentially less risky, positively react to the implementation of the new 
regulatory regime.  
 The profitability indicator is generally positively related to the stock market reactions. This 
confirms the prior hypothesis that more profitable banks were expected to reveal positive 
abnormal performance compared to less profitable ones. Unexpectedly, for G-SIBs and institutions 
located outside the euro-area, the coefficient is negative and significant. For G-SIBs, the magnitude 
of the coefficient is noteworthy (-3.469, significant at the 5% level) suggesting a non-favourable 
market sentiment towards a highly performing, yet potentially risky, banking activity.  
                                                        
27 In the interests of brevity, the estimated results for the regressions which include the ordinary leverage ratio or the 
CET1, as proxies for the level of capitalization, are not tabulated in this version of the paper.  
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 The degree of diversification in banking activities demonstrates a mixed association with 
stock price reactions. It yields a positive and significant coefficient for both the whole sample and 
the sub-group of banks located outside the euro area (0.044 and 0.102, respectively). Lastly, the 
ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (the proxy for ex-ante risk taking) appears significant 
only in the case of banks located outside euro countries. Furthermore, the relatively weak 
coefficient of 0.087 has a negative sign. 
6 Robustness checks 
 This section reports some robustness checks on the results from the univariate analysis. 
More specifically, for the CDS and stock market the investigation was repeated by focusing on a 1-
day event window. Findings for the analysis on the CDS market are the more interesting ones (see 
Table 14). Overall, a greater extent of statistical significance is revealed. Consistent with the main 
analysis, the coefficients associated with the announcement date considered as a cornerstone of 
the new banking resolution regime (i.e. 20 March 2014) are positive and highly significant for each 
of the bank sub-groups. The aggregate impact of the eight announcements on the CA is negative, in 
line with the results from our main investigation. Nevertheless, an abnormal upsurge in the CDS 
market is reported on the CA announcement date (i.e. 23 October 2013). When focusing on the 
exact date of the events, the disclosure of the CA process (i.e. 17 July 2014) is associated with an 
increase in the level of banks’ CDS spreads. A negative sentiment, reflected in increasing CDS 
spreads, is also associated with the announcement related to the official launch of the SSM in 
November 2014. Uncertainty about the future oversight regime, combined with higher compliance 
costs, could motivate market participants’ reaction, at least in the short-run. In Table 15, for the 
stock market, the coefficients are of the same direction as in Table 8 with the 3-day window, but 
generally less strongly significant.28 
7 Conclusions 
 This paper provides detailed insights on the financial market sentiment surrounding the 
initial steps towards a BU in Europe. By adopting an event study methodology, we investigate the 
CDS, stock and stock futures markets’ reactions to each announcement date preceding the start of 
the SSM. Furthermore, we also capture the heterogeneity in the reactions across different banks’ 
sub-groups and investigate how financial market responses are associated with bank-specific 
variables.   
 The first stage of the empirical analysis focuses on the impact of the BU announcements on 
three different financial markets. The findings demonstrate that the announcements related to the 
implementation of the new supervisory mechanism led to a general increase in banks’ CDS 
spreads, especially pronounced for the group of G-SIBs. Corresponding to the announcements on 
                                                        
28 The analysis was also conducted using a non-industry specific index, i.e. the MSCI Europe Index. Although a larger 
magnitude of the significant coefficients is found, the inferences are not altered. In the interests of brevity, these results 
are not tabulated in the paper. 
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the CA, negative abnormal changes in the CDS spreads were revealed. Market participants 
positively assessed the contribution of the exercise in enhancing transparency and reducing the 
risk associated with banking activity. Finally, positive coefficients were reported for 
announcements on the new bank resolution rules, reflecting a rise in CDS prices. This indicates a 
potential increase in the perceived level of banks’ debt riskiness linked to the bail-in philosophy 
underlying the new European procedures for the resolution of ailing banks. Interestingly, CDS of G-
SIBs were shown to significantly react to the implementation of the BU project. Their impending 
subjection to enhanced supervision and higher capital requirements, combined with a potentially 
reduced degree of public support, might motivate this finding.  
The abnormal event-induced movements in the stock market were consistent with the 
evidence reported for the CDS market. Banks’ stock prices reacted in a consistent manner with the 
CDS market. The implementation of the new supervisory component had a negative effect on 
banks’ stock prices. This evidence could be attributed to the (higher) compliance costs associated 
with more complex and demanding oversight of banks. The market responses to the key 
announcements on the CA were strongly positive for all bank groups. This result underlines the 
beneficial effect of an increased level of transparency combined with the fact that several banks 
improved their capital position in advance of the CA procedure. Announcements on the new 
European resolution rules had a negative impact on all banks’ stocks. However, stock prices of 
banks located in European but non-euro area countries showed the most limited reaction, while 
stock prices of G-SIBs did not show any significant response. The univariate analysis on the stock 
futures market did not highlight any specific pattern of sensitivity in response to the changes in the 
European regulatory landscape. The latter evidence is consistent with the likely presence of better 
informed participants active in the derivatives market.  
 The multivariate analysis demonstrated that the degree of capitalization is commonly in a 
negative association with abnormal movements in the CDS market. However, for the sub-group of 
G-SIBs a direct relationship is detected. This evidence might indicate that market participants 
perceived a higher riskiness indicated by increasing levels of capital. Furthermore, the imposition 
through regulatory actions of raising costly capital, because of future uncertain profitability, can 
increase the probability of non-viability in the long-term. Regardless of their levels of capital, 
institutions which are incapable of generating profits are not safe. For banks located in non-euro 
area countries and the G-SIBs, a weak underlying credit quality is an influential factor in explaining 
abnormal increases in CDS spreads. Overall, bank-specific features for the sub-sample of G-SIBs 
were demonstrated to particularly affect reactions of the CDS market. The corresponding analysis 
on the stock market revealed positive associations of the CARs with capital levels and business 
model orientation. A higher level of capitalization, especially when captured by a non-risk based 
leverage measure, was associated with positive abnormal performance in the stock market. The 
same consideration held for the stock prices of banks with a business model more focused on 
traditional activities.  
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 The need for strengthening bank supervisory and regulatory integration in Europe was 
inevitable once the inherent contradiction existing in its financial architecture was recognised. 
More unified financial markets across countries existed alongside fragmentation of banking 
oversight and banking safety nets along domestic lines. Fostering financial stability and banking 
integration in Europe was thus a central aim of BU, while addressing the incompleteness of the 
Monetary Union. Higher supervisory standards, based on independence and transparency, and 
complemented by a common resolution framework were perceived by the markets as beneficial in 
improving the resilience of the euro area banking sector. On the other hand, the higher compliance 
and regulatory costs associated with the new mechanisms were negatively received by investors. 
In this view, the potential for distortive competitive incentives among larger, and directly 
supervised institutions, and smaller banks (i.e. less significant banks) could hinder the creation of a 
real level playing field in the euro area. Retaining an appropriate balance between the objectives of 
central and national mechanisms is therefore crucial, from the perspective of achieving a greater 
level of harmonisation. Furthermore, an incomplete BU, lacking its third pillar (i.e. a euro area 
deposit insurance), also represents an additional source of uncertainty and risk affecting economic 
and financial stability (Angeloni, 2018). Therefore, European policymakers should develop a 
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Table 1: Expected impact on CDS, stock and stock futures markets of the implementation of the BU 
Event 
Expected impact on bank 
CDS market 
Expected impact on bank stock &                                   





Implementation        





new bail-in rules 
 
 Improvement of banking system stability 








 Adverse impact on profitability 
Uncertainty about new rules 
Description: The table presents the main hypotheses regarding the impact of the implementation of the BU on the three 









































Table 2: Data sample 
        Comprehensive 
Assessment 
        




SSM CDS Futures G-SIBs 
1 ERSTE GROUP BANK  AT 199,157 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    
2 DEXIA  BE 222,894 ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   
3 KBC GROUP  BE 239,825 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓     
4 COMMERZBANK  DE 546,565 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓     
5 DEUTSCHE BANK DE 1,604,329 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
6 DANSKE BANK  DK 432,421   ✓   ✓     
7 JYSKE BANK DK 35,119   ✓         
8 SYDBANK  DK 19,812   ✓         
9 BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA ES 570,993 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓     
10 BANCO DE SABADELL ES 157,225 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
11 BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL  ES 144,709 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
12 BANCO SANTANDER ES 1,094,570 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
13 BANKINTER ES 55,003 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
14 BNP PARIBAS FR 1,792,578 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
15 CREDIT AGRICOLE FR 1,534,097 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
16 SOCIETE GENERALE FR 1,229,166 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
17 ALPHA BANK GR 70,908 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
18 EUROBANK ERGASIAS GR 74,523 ✓ ✓ ✓       
19 NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE  GR 108,521 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓     
20 OTP BANK HU 34,943   ✓     ✓   
21 ALLIED IRISH BANK IE 113,906 ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   
22 GOV. COMP. BANK OF IRELAND IE 130,423 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
23 BANCA CARIGE IT 40,371 ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   
24 BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI IT 194,936 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
25 BANCA PICCOLO CREDITO VALTELLINESE IT 26,704 ✓ ✓         
26 BANCA POPOLARE DELL'EMILIA ROMAGNA IT 60,720 ✓ ✓ ✓       
27 BANCA POPOLARE DI MILANO IT 48,507 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
28 BANCA POPOLARE DI SONDRIO IT 32,461 ✓ ✓ ✓       
29 BANCO POPOLARE IT 123,190 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
30 CREDITO EMILIANO IT 31,346 ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓   
31 INTESA SANPAOLO IT 615,304 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
32 MEDIOBANCA  IT 72,192 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
33 UNICREDIT IT 827,217 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
34 UNIONE DI BANCHE ITALIANE IT 121,961 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
35 BANK OF VALLETTA MT 7,188 ✓ ✓ ✓       
36 ING GROUP NL 1,079,244 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
37 DNB Bank NO 285,681   ✓   ✓     
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38 BANK BPH  PL 7,882   ✓         
39 PKO BANK POLSKI PL 47,779   ✓     ✓   
40 BANCO BPI  PT 42,182 ✓ ✓ ✓       
41 BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES PT 79,825 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓     
42 NOVA KREDITNA BANKA MARIBOR SI 4,810 ✓ ✓ ✓       
43 VSEOBECNA UVEROVA BANKA SK 11,514 ✓ ✓ ✓       
44 NORDEA BANK  SE 629,994   ✓   ✓ ✓   
45 SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN  SE 281,293   ✓   ✓     
46 SWEDBANK SE 205,686   ✓   ✓     
47 BARCLAYS UK 1,571,466   ✓   ✓   ✓ 
48 HSBC HOLDINGS  UK 1,933,861   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
49 LLOYDS BANKING GROUP UK 1,011,930   ✓   ✓ ✓   
50 ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP UK 1,231,250   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Description: The table shows the list of banks included in the sample and their country of origin. It reports figures on 
banks’ total assets as at 31/12/2013 (in line with the data used in the CA). It also indicates whether the financial 
institution (i) participated in both the AQR and stress test; (ii) is falling under the direct supervision of the SSM; (iii) has 
CDS data available; (iv) has stock futures data; and (v) is classified as G-SIB.  
Notes: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Spain are  euro area countries. Among these, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain are peripheral euro area countries 
(i.e. GIIPS countries). Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and United Kingdom are EU but non-euro area countries. 
Norway is the only non-EU country.  
Sample sizes, for both the CDS and stock market, are in line with recent banking literature (e.g. Sahin and de Haan, 2016; 
























Table 3: Key-event dates 
# Date Type Description 
1 12/09/2012 Supervision 
ECB welcomes Commission’s proposal for a single supervisory 
mechanism 
2 13/12/2012 Supervision ECB President Mario Draghi welcomes the agreement on the SSM 
3 12/09/2013 Supervision 





ECB starts comprehensive assessment in advance of supervisory 
role 
5 08/11/2013 Resolution 





ECB makes progress with asset quality review, and confirms stress 
test parameters for comprehensive assessment 
7 07/02/2014 Supervision 





ECB publishes manual for asset quality review 
9 20/03/2014 Resolution Statement of the ECB on SRM agreement 




ECB to give banks six to nine months to cover capital shortfalls 
















ECB’s in-depth review shows banks need to take further action 
16 30/10/2014 Supervision ECB publishes Regulation on supervisory fees 
17 04/11/2014 Supervision ECB assumes responsibility for euro area banking supervision 
Note: Since 26 October 2014, the date of publication of the CA outcomes, was a Sunday, the day considered as event date 
is the following trading day (27/10/14).  
Press releases on supervision matters and associated issues are usually published in the morning at 10:00 CET, although 
there is no stated fixed rule on the timing.  
















Table 4: Bank-specific variables included in the multivariate analysis 
Label Variable Indicator Expected impact  
      CDS market Stock & 
stock futures 
CAR (-1,1) Cumulative Abnormal Return (%) (bps) Dep. Var.     
TIER1_RATIO TIER 1 Capital to Risk-weighted Assets  (%) Capitalization - + /= 
NPL NPLs to Gross Loans (%) Asset Quality  + - 
TOT_ASSET Total Assets (Ln) Size + - 
ST_FUND Deposit and Short Term Funding to Total Assets (%) Funding Structure - + 
CET1 Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio (%) Capitalization - + /= 
LOAN_TA Net Loans to Total Assets (%) Business Model - + 
LEVERAGE_T Total Assets to Total Equity - Ordinary measure (%) Capitalization - + /= 
INTEREST Interest Income to Average Earning Assets (%)  Profitability  - + 
NON_INTEREST Non-Interest Income to Gross Revenues (%) Diversification  - + 
RWA_TA Risk-weighted Assets to Total Assets (%) Ex-ante Risk Taking + - 
Note: The table presents the entire set of bank-level explanatory variables considered in the multivariate analysis, as 
well as the dependent variable (bank CAR computed over a 3-day event window around each announcement). It reports 































Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A - CDS market 
VARIABLES Obs. Min Max Mean Median Std.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness 
CAR (-1,1) 561 -32.66 16.11 -0.31 0.11 6.71 10.11 -1.75 
TIER1_RATIO 525 7.38 22.43 13.08 12.33 3.00 4.95 1.28 
NPL 561 0.47 38.59 9.66 6.09 8.73 4.59 1.47 
TOT_ASSET 561 10.46 14.59 12.74 12.61 1.25 1.82 -0.21 
ST_FUND 561 37.01 88.45 58.42 58.03 11.30 2.81 0.38 
CET1 537 8.38 21.01 12.29 11.70 2.51 6.34 1.66 
LOAN_TA 561 19.63 74.04 51.96 55.74 15.04 2.49 -0.69 
LEVERAGE_T 561 2.68 11.27 5.99 5.90 1.90 3.39 0.74 
INTEREST 561 1.35 5.85 2.99 2.87 1.06 3.50 0.89 
NON_INTEREST 561 7.76 60.40 37.37 38.57 11.80 2.48 -0.34 
RWA_TA 544 17.06 83.37 40.99 41.55 14.66 3.64 0.66 
Panel B - Stock and stock futures markets 
VARIABLES Obs. Min Max Mean Median Std.Dev. Kurtosis Skewness 
CAR (-1,1) 850 -14.58 12.35 0.01 0.13 3.60 7.17 -0.41 
TIER1_RATIO 720 7.59 23.30 13.32 12.33 3.24 4.43 1.12 
NPL 850 0.47 44.89 11.43 7.49 10.10 5.03 1.52 
TOT_ASSET 850 8.38 14.59 11.98 11.90 1.59 2.24 -0.14 
ST_FUND 850 37.01 88.45 62.25 62.30 13.21 2.01 0.03 
CET1 785 5.09 21.01 12.46 11.75 2.83 4.05 0.75 
LOAN_TA 850 19.63 74.69 54.68 56.77 13.91 3.13 -0.86 
LEVERAGE_T 850 1.27 16.03 6.70 6.38 2.79 4.55 1.08 
INTEREST 850 1.36 10.49 3.38 3.01 1.50 11.21 2.33 
NON_INTEREST 850 0.12 176.15 38.62 38.57 20.37 29.87 4.17 
RWA_TA 809 17.06 83.37 45.29 46.31 15.64 2.69 0.24 
Description: The table reports the descriptive statistics on both the dependent variable and bank explanatory variables. 
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Obs. refers to the number of observations, which potentially 
differs to numbers reported in the tables for the multivariate analysis (Tables 12 and 13) due to differing sub-samples in 
different estimations and/or because of missing observations for some explanatory variables for some banks. 














Table 6: CDS market reaction to the key BU announcements 
# Date   ALL   EU_EZ   GIIPS   EU_NONEZ   G-SIBS   
1 12/09/12 CAAR 1.1218   1.0816   -0.5050   1.2473   4.6398   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.7576   0.7232   0.4996   0.9035   0.6577   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.5887   0.8433   0.2878   0.4540   0.0312 ** 
2 13/12/12 CAAR -0.9244   -1.3123   -0.8395   0.2878   -1.8727   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.4691   0.3101   0.2877   0.5544   0.4379   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.6805   0.4382   0.8737   0.5956   0.1130   
3 12/09/13 CAAR 2.4811   2.9303   3.1363   1.0773   2.7447   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.4922   0.3570   0.3829   0.8373   0.6406   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.2023   0.0510 * 0.0723 * 0.3971   0.7495   
4 23/10/13 CAAR 2.0812   2.3810   2.8689   1.1443   2.9654   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.6271   0.6944   0.4213   0.2278   0.2141   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0004 *** 0.0126 ** 0.1476   0.0063 *** 0.0008 *** 
5 08/11/13 CAAR -3.2996   -4.1079   -5.0997   -0.7737   -1.7100   
  Resolution p-value (adjBMP) 0.3440   0.3527   0.4419   0.2722   0.0849 * 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0000 *** 0.0015 *** 0.1083   0.0039 *** 0.0010 *** 
6 03/02/14 CAAR -0.0603   -0.0510   0.2502   -0.0893   -0.3958   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.3876   0.3947   0.3168   0.5126   0.5167   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.4957   0.7165   0.7412   0.4590   0.3576   
7 07/02/14 CAAR -0.1411   -0.7376   -1.6866   1.7230   0.6986   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.7597   0.8986   0.9900   0.1364   0.6248   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.3018   0.6917   0.0250 ** 0.0054 *** 0.1363   
8 11/03/14 CAAR 0.0225   -0.1838   -0.3252   0.6673   0.4485   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.5965   0.7087   0.6922   0.4531   0.8691   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.8132   0.9255   0.3861   0.5217   0.7603   
9 20/03/14 CAAR 6.2191   6.7649   7.1156   4.5135   7.4345   
  Resolution p-value (adjBMP) 0.0050 *** 0.0138 ** 0.0012 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0042 *** 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0009 *** 
10 25/04/14 CAAR -1.0031   -1.2679   -2.7451   -0.1756   0.9870   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.9329   0.9249   0.7364   0.9786   0.5423   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.2423   0.3530   0.1526   0.4624   0.3564   
11 29/04/14 CAAR -2.4313   -2.3463   -1.2230   -2.6970   -4.7610   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.1445   0.2110   0.4062   0.0558 * 0.0116 ** 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0003 *** 0.0033 *** 0.1583   0.0299 ** 0.0066 *** 
12 17/07/14 CAAR -1.4053   -1.3038   -1.3230   -1.7225   -3.2398   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.3491   0.4677   0.3926   0.0373 ** 0.1235   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0027 *** 0.0385 ** 0.0920 * 0.0152 ** 0.0037 *** 
13 08/08/14 CAAR -2.1117   -2.6084   -2.3432   -0.5597   -3.4918   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.7897   0.6790   0.8483   0.8761   0.3026   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0010 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0298 ** 0.3198   0.0037 *** 
 32 
14 04/09/14 CAAR 0.6974   0.5283   1.0726   1.2258   -0.4369   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.6997   0.8424   0.7492   0.4571   0.9988   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.8159   0.7265   0.9383   0.2797   0.2696   
15 27/10/14 CAAR -3.2008   -3.8050   -4.8887   -1.3127   -0.7366   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.3814   0.4077   0.3408   0.1852   0.5488   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0000 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0150 ** 0.0216 ** 
16 30/10/14 CAAR 2.9913   3.8121   4.9821   0.4265   2.5274   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.7029   0.7215   0.7462   0.6755   0.3326   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.1773   0.0841 * 0.2982   0.7633   0.0119 ** 
17 04/11/14 CAAR -2.0983   -2.9666   -3.3491   0.6151   0.5505   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.7737   0.6994   0.7511   0.6008   0.7388   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.9713   0.7792   0.1279   0.6758   0.1840   
Description: The table reports the CAARs in the CDS market (in bps) in response to the key announcements on the BU. It 
indicates whether the event is related to the supervision, resolution or CA. It shows the CAARs for (i) the entire sample of banks 
(ALL); (ii) banks located in euro area countries (EU_EZ); (iii) banks located in euro area peripheral countries (GIIPS); (iv) banks 
located in EU non-euro area countries (EU_NONEZ); and (v) G-SIBs. Significance is tested according to the adjusted version of 
the Boehmer et al. (1991) test (adjBMP) by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) and the generalized sign test by Cowan (1992) 
(GENSIGN).  











































Table 7: Aggregate CAARs (CDS market) 
Panel A - Aggregate CAARs           
Type of event  ALL EU_EZ GIIPS EU_NONEZ G-SIBS 
Supervision 2.43 1.54 -1.01 5.20 10.28 
Comprehensive Assessment -6.41 -7.39 -5.91 -3.34 -9.65 
Resolution 2.92 2.66 2.02 3.74 5.72 
            
Panel B - Significant aggregate CAARs         
Type of event  ALL EU_EZ GIIPS EU_NONEZ G-SIBS 
Supervision   6.74 1.45 1.72 7.17 
Comprehensive Assessment -7.07 -7.68 -8.55 -4.59 -9.26 
Resolution 2.92 2.66 7.12 3.74 5.72 
Description: The table reports the aggregate CAARs in the CDS market (in bps) for the entire sample and the bank sub-groups. 
The event dates are grouped on the basis of their relevance in terms of (i) bank supervision; (ii) ECB’s CA; and (iii) bank 
resolution. The figures are the outcome of an aggregation across events of the same nature. Significance is tested according to 
the adjusted version of the Boehmer et al. (1991) test by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) and the generalized sign test by Cowan 
(1992).  
Note: Panel A reports the aggregate data, based on Table 6, resulting from the sum of the coefficients associated with events on 
























Table 8: Stock market reaction to the key BU announcements  
# Date   ALL   EU_EZ   GIIPS   EU_NONEZ   G-SIBS   
1 12/09/12 CAAR 0.3758   0.6212   0.9260   -0.2575   -0.5933   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.8168   0.9828   0.9731   0.1650   0.3866   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.7310   0.5758   0.6401   0.1895   0.4131   
2 13/12/12 CAAR 1.1538   1.7293   2.0081   -0.3531   -0.3432   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.1953   0.1226   0.0635 * 0.5928   0.6273   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0083 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0089 *** 0.8464   0.6788   
3 12/09/13 CAAR 0.0512   0.3592   0.9097   -0.6230   -0.1845   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.9556   0.5641   0.1493   0.1626   0.6671   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.8809   0.1438   0.0103 ** 0.0634 * 0.4051   
4 23/10/13 CAAR -0.1164   -0.9708   -1.5919   1.7581   0.4229   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.8527   0.4586   0.4290   0.0049 *** 0.8311   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0677 * 0.6378   0.4546   0.0116 ** 0.7388   
5 08/11/13 CAAR -1.0969   -1.2879   -0.3981   -0.4621   0.0743   
  Resolution p-value (adjBMP) 0.2237   0.4179   0.3282   0.6691   0.8101   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0665 * 0.0637 * 0.0195 ** 0.8176   0.7459   
6 03/02/14 CAAR -0.2380   -0.2867   0.5677   -0.0799   -0.6385   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.8631   0.9862   0.7259   0.8440   0.1113   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.2802   0.2154   0.3214   0.7343   0.7857   
7 07/02/14 CAAR 0.8571   0.9409   1.4381   0.7783   -0.1261   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.1497   0.1349   0.0408 ** 0.5413   0.4204   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.1024   0.0577 * 0.0255 ** 0.7425   0.3803   
8 11/03/14 CAAR 6.4376   9.5391   13.2723   -1.5864   0.3080   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.4049   0.4564   0.5198   0.0492 ** 0.9271   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0064 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0470 ** 0.7549   
9 20/03/14 CAAR -0.9411   -0.9599   -0.6281   -1.0632   -0.1483   
  Resolution p-value (adjBMP) 0.4179   0.6577   0.7220   0.4800   0.8652   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.2198   0.2927   0.3385   0.3562   0.7657   
10 25/04/14 CAAR -1.5586   -1.8418   -1.8634   -0.9070   0.0551   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.0315 ** 0.1168   0.3512   0.3103   0.7660   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.2351   0.3210   0.9936   0.3427   0.7459   
11 29/04/14 CAAR -0.5886   -0.8789   -0.9439   0.0038   -0.2308   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.3692   0.3354   0.6005   0.9552   0.6365   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.5698   0.6866   0.4172   0.8601   0.7477   
12 17/07/14 CAAR -0.1172   0.0383   0.0172   -0.6020   0.2782   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.8830   0.8770   0.9820   0.4122   0.4147   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.6524   0.9063   0.8967   0.4259   0.3322   
13 08/08/14 CAAR -0.0185   0.0082   -1.0527   -0.1367   -0.2924   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.9520   0.9653   0.1858   0.7576   0.3652   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.8915   0.8846   0.1805   0.8193   0.3985   
14 04/09/14 CAAR 1.4763   2.2559   2.6704   -0.3514   0.3302   
  Comprehensive p-value (adjBMP) 0.1176   0.0098 *** 0.0515 * 0.7253   0.2924   
 35 
  Assessment p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0037 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0001 *** 0.1449   0.1248   
15 27/10/14 CAAR 0.1297   0.1082   -0.7297   0.0591   0.2519   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.1000   0.1170   0.5322   0.8570   0.6119   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.3949   0.0910 * 0.8188   0.1555   0.7228   
16 30/10/14 CAAR -2.6003   -4.4766   -6.3840   2.5211   0.4629   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.1634   0.0006 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0001 *** 0.9455   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0237 ** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0026 *** 0.1451   
17 04/11/14 CAAR 0.2314   0.3536   0.0485   -0.1039   0.2954   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.9955   0.9917   0.4950   0.9221   0.2982   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.4137   0.5134   0.5134   0.8109   0.3405   
Description: The table reports the CAARs in the stock market (in %) in response to the key announcement on the BU. It indicates 
if the event is related to the supervision, resolution or CA. It shows the CAARs for (i) the entire sample of banks (ALL); (ii) banks 
located in euro area countries (EU_EZ); (iii) banks located in euro area peripheral countries (GIIPS); (iv) banks located in EU 
non-euro area countries (EU_NONEZ); and (v) G-SIBs. Significance is tested according to the adjusted version of the Boehmer et 
al. (1991) test (adjBMP) by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) and the generalized sign test by Cowan (1992) (GENSIGN).  
















































Table 9: Aggregate CAARs (stock market) 
Panel A - Aggregate CAARs           
Type of event  ALL EU_EZ GIIPS EU_NONEZ G-SIBS 
Supervision -1.49 -2.31 -2.92 1.05 -0.43 
Comprehensive Assessment 6.96 9.81 12.21 -0.94 0.43 
Resolution -2.04 -2.25 -1.03 -1.53 -0.07 
            
Panel B - Significant aggregate CAARs         
Type of event  ALL EU_EZ GIIPS EU_NONEZ G-SIBS 
Supervision -3.01 -1.81 -2.03 1.90   
Comprehensive Assessment 7.80 11.90 15.94 0.17   
Resolution -1.10 -1.29 -0.40     
Description: The table reports the aggregate CAARs in the stock market (in %) for the entire sample and the bank sub-groups. 
The event dates are grouped on the basis of their relevance in terms of (i) bank supervision; (ii) ECB’s CA; and (iii) bank 
resolution. The figures are the outcome of an aggregation across events of the same nature. Significance is tested according to 
the adjusted version of the Boehmer et al. (1991) test by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) and the generalized sign test by Cowan 
(1992).  
Note: Panel A reports the aggregate data, based on Table 6, resulting from the sum of the coefficients associated with events on 
































Table 10: Stock futures market reaction to the key BU announcements 
# Date   ALL   EU_EZ   GIIPS   EU_NONEZ   G-SIBS   
1 12/09/12 CAAR 0.6609   0.5274   0.8273   1.1683   -0.2160   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.8152   0.8326   0.4964   0.8663   0.0234 ** 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.6061   0.7734   0.4006   0.5693   0.2360   
2 13/12/12 CAAR 0.2168   0.7073   0.9874   -1.6473   -1.1940   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.6678   0.3105   0.0998 * 0.0582 * 0.3363   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.8525   0.7054   0.3618   0.2510   0.2347   
3 12/09/13 CAAR 0.7189   0.8204   0.9952   0.3334   0.0990   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.4181   0.3521   0.2288   0.9044   0.6104   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0385 ** 0.0119 ** 0.0154 ** 0.7099   0.6421   
4 23/10/13 CAAR -1.2171   -1.9451   -2.6699   -3.2402   0.4345   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.7003   0.5131   0.4737   0.0489 ** 0.5027   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0424 ** 0.2673   0.7390   0.0224 ** 0.1786   
5 08/11/13 CAAR 0.0639   0.2837   0.2542   -0.7713   0.6522   
  Resolution p-value (adjBMP) 0.4128   0.5246   0.5056   0.7112   0.7487   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.6708   0.8298   0.4916   0.6084   0.1774   
6 03/02/14 CAAR 9.6544   12.754
1 
  2.7015   -2.1243   2.4925   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.1813   0.5266   0.7249   0.1327   0.0149 ** 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.4966   0.9133   0.8880   0.2015   0.1786   
7 07/02/14 CAAR 1.0830   1.3046   1.4913   0.2408   -0.5725   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.0669 * 0.0806 * 0.0185 ** 0.7010   0.0518 * 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0107 ** 0.0316 ** 0.0148 ** 0.1605   0.1752   
8 11/03/14 CAAR 9.7726   13.197
0 
  15.8953   -3.2402   -2.6170   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.4598   0.4450   0.4270   0.0001 *** 0.0094 *** 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.4708   0.7496   0.9611   0.0286 ** 0.2947   
9 20/03/14 CAAR -1.6041   -1.9837   -1.1612   -0.1617   0.1406   
  Resolution p-value (adjBMP) 0.9040   0.8053   0.7090   0.8755   0.3899   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.4718   0.2870   0.1297   0.6233   0.4688   
10 25/04/14 CAAR -1.2476   -1.1607   -0.7492   -1.5781   -0.6035   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.1609   0.4519   0.7538   0.1245   0.7915   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.2335   0.8463   0.5068   0.0262 ** 0.1991   
11 29/04/14 CAAR -0.3518   -0.4372   -0.6232   -0.0275   0.7387   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.5402   0.4340   0.6599   0.6315   0.2752   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.3702   0.4388   0.5188   0.6484   0.1626   
12 17/07/14 CAAR -0.0651   0.0231   0.3004   -0.4004   -0.3879   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.4539   0.3042   0.3487   0.7113   0.8442   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.6891   0.5041   0.7004   0.6738   0.6434   
13 08/08/14 CAAR -0.3844   -0.3009   -0.6679   -0.7016   -0.2560   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.5122   0.9652   0.6497   0.1649   0.5251   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.9551   0.4410   0.8448   0.1713   0.6509   
14 04/09/14 CAAR 0.7823   1.0467   1.4196   -0.2228   -0.6659   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.7933   0.8522   0.9088   0.8896   0.5857   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.6820   0.8041   0.5175   0.6789   0.6789   
 38 
15 27/10/14 CAAR -1.4852   -1.5179   -2.0324   -1.3612   -0.8402   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.1897   0.4549   0.5353   0.2790   0.0064 *** 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.1894   0.4374   0.1531   0.1735   0.1931   
16 30/10/14 CAAR -1.4009   -2.9271   -3.4764   4.3988   2.9421   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.4151   0.5943   0.6069   0.0028 *** 0.0165 ** 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.7107   0.4750   0.6990   0.0281 ** 0.1746   
17 04/11/14 CAAR -0.5376   -0.6150   -0.9800   -0.2433   0.0618   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.0803 * 0.1101   0.0574 * 0.6003   0.6212   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.6507   0.7890   0.3757   0.6383   0.6789   
Description: The table reports the CAARs in the stock futures market (in %) in response to the key announcement on the BU. It 
indicates if the event is related to the supervision, resolution or CA. It shows the CAARs for (i) the entire sample of banks (ALL); 
(ii) banks located in euro area countries (EU_EZ); (iii) banks located in euro area peripheral countries (GIIPS); (iv) banks located 
in EU non-euro area countries (EU_NONEZ); and (v) G-SIBs. Significance is tested according to the adjusted version of the 
Boehmer et al. (1991) test (adjBMP) by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) and the generalized sign test by Cowan (1992) (GENSIGN).  


















































Table 11: Aggregate CAARs (stock futures market) 
Panel A - Aggregate CAARs           
Type of event  ALL EU_EZ GIIPS EU_NONEZ G-SIBS 
Supervision 0.03 -0.73 0.08 2.92 0.46 
Comprehensive Assessment 16.71 22.82 14.32 -11.32 -1.10 
Resolution -1.54 -1.70 -0.91 -0.93 0.79 
            
Panel B - Significant aggregate CAARs           
Type of event  ALL EU_EZ GIIPS EU_NONEZ G-SIBS 
Supervision 1.26 2.12 2.49 1.17 2.15 
Comprehensive Assessment -1.22     -6.48 -0.96 
Resolution           
Description: The table reports the aggregate CAARs in the stock futures market (in %) for the entire sample and the bank sub-
groups. The event dates are grouped on the basis of their relevance in terms of (i) bank supervision; (ii) ECB’s CA; and (iii) bank 
resolution. The figures are the outcome of an aggregation across events of the same nature. Significance is tested according to 
the adjusted version of the Boehmer et al. (1991) test by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) and the generalized sign test by Cowan 
(1992).  
Note: Panel A reports the aggregate data, based on Table 6, resulting from the sum of the coefficients associated with events on 




































Table 12: Determinants of CARs (CDS market) 
VARIABLES           
  ALL EU_EZ GIIPS EU_NONEZ G-SIBS 
TIER1_RATIO -0.023 -0.118 -1.881 -0.167 1.726** 
  (0.188) (0.422) (1.140) (0.165) (0.679) 
NPL -0.050 -0.098 -0.311 1.100** 3.163*** 
  (0.184) (0.204) (0.207) (0.395) (0.649) 
TOT_ASSET -14.218 -17.789 -15.032 -6.662 15.590 
  (8.828) (11.116) (12.420) (7.083) (12.947) 
ST_FUND 0.272** 0.286 0.131 0.128 -0.355** 
  (0.124) (0.186) (0.254) (0.141) (0.140) 
LOAN_TA -0.362* -0.382 0.325 0.009 0.047 
  (0.207) (0.265) (0.443) (0.177) (0.481) 
INTEREST 0.597 0.366 -3.687 -3.914** -3.010 
  (0.856) (1.109) (2.247) (1.568) (4.176) 
NON_INTEREST 0.085 0.068 0.310* -0.097*** -0.475*** 
  (0.068) (0.159) (0.171) (0.033) (0.145) 
RWA_TA -0.001 0.003 0.239* -0.070* 0.505 
  (0.109) (0.146) (0.135) (0.040) (0.455) 
            
Obs. 520 384 248 136 170 
R-squared 0.300 0.313 0.369 0.456 0.625 
Description: The table reports the results for the regression model presented in Section 4.2, for the entire sample and the bank 
sub-groups, related to the CDS market. The dependent variable is the bank CAR calculated over a 3-day event window. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at bank-year level (in parentheses).  






















Table 13: Determinants of CARs (stock market) 
VARIABLES           
  ALL EU_EZ PIIGS EU_NONEZ G-SIBS 
TIER1_RATIO 0.200** 0.385*** 0.311 -0.088 -0.034 
  (0.098) (0.146) (0.257) (0.073) (0.150) 
NPL -0.077 -0.015 -0.063 -0.108 0.667*** 
  (0.059) (0.080) (0.102) (0.183) (0.209) 
TOT_ASSET -2.735 0.502 -1.833 -5.595** 4.800 
  (1.957) (3.528) (4.981) (2.518) (4.729) 
ST_FUND -0.054 -0.071 -0.087 0.053 -0.075 
  (0.036) (0.046) (0.063) (0.055) (0.067) 
LOAN_TA 0.053 0.117 0.032 0.209** 0.595*** 
  (0.049) (0.074) (0.081) (0.082) (0.206) 
INTEREST 0.319 0.765 0.496 -0.979* -3.469** 
  (0.579) (0.593) (0.779) (0.502) (1.453) 
NON_INTEREST 0.044* 0.033 -0.022 0.102*** -0.046 
  (0.025) (0.028) (0.068) (0.030) (0.066) 
RWA_TA 0.028 0.031 0.047 -0.087** -0.084 
  (0.043) (0.046) (0.054) (0.041) (0.066) 
            
Obs. 703 501 326 185 170 
R-squared 0.142 0.243 0.344 0.343 0.118 
Description: The table reports the results for the regression model presented in Section 4.2, for the entire sample and the bank 
sub-groups, related to the stock market. The dependent variable is the bank CAR calculated over a 3-day event window. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at bank-year level (in parentheses).  


























Table 14: CDS market reaction to the key BU announcements (1-day event window) 
# Date   ALL   EU_EZ   GIIPS   EU_NONEZ   G-SIBS   
1 12/09/12 CAAR -1.4798   -1.2840   -1.4220   -2.0917   -1.2223   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.6771   0.8427   0.9251   0.2890   0.6308   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.1216   0.3162   0.5736   0.1698   0.3893   
2 13/12/12 CAAR -0.0551   0.0315   0.5924   -0.3256   -1.4444   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.6218   0.5240   0.7011   0.9776   0.4058   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.9508   0.9761   0.7279   0.8589   0.3263   
3 12/09/13 CAAR 1.7854   1.8955   2.1628   1.4411   1.6790   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.0816 * 0.1468   0.1984   0.0020 *** 0.1962   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0002 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0723 * 0.0071 *** 0.0063 *** 
4 23/10/13 CAAR 1.1946   1.3253   1.5563   0.7860   0.9750   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.0362 ** 0.0403 ** 0.0051 *** 0.0190 ** 0.1821   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0030 *** 0.0063 *** 0.0008 *** 
5 08/11/13 CAAR -0.0273   -0.1427   -0.4018   0.3335   1.0078   
  Resolution p-value (adjBMP) 0.9325   0.9853   0.9161   0.5219   0.5942   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0016 *** 0.0136 ** 0.0533 * 0.0393 ** 0.0063 *** 
6 03/02/14 CAAR -2.1836   -2.4976   -3.2468   -1.2024   -2.2827   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.0554 * 0.0619 * 0.0732 * 0.1350   0.0012 *** 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0312 ** 0.0009 *** 
7 07/02/14 CAAR 1.4976   1.4650   1.7279   1.5993   1.6900   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.0564 * 0.0529 * 0.0489 ** 0.0557 * 0.0592 * 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0001 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0198 ** 0.0378 ** 0.0010 *** 
8 11/03/14 CAAR -1.5544   -1.8644   -2.4117   -0.5853   -1.2939   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.2335   0.2606   0.3022   0.1808   0.1715   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0036 *** 0.0038 *** 0.0009 *** 
9 20/03/14 CAAR 7.5298   8.2075   8.3907   5.4118   9.6031   
  Resolution p-value (adjBMP) 0.0036 *** 0.0097 *** 0.0027 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0013 *** 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0009 *** 
10 25/04/14 CAAR 1.2373   1.5058   1.3329   0.3983   1.5097   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.2248   0.1736   0.3276   0.5738   0.4336   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0007 *** 0.0019 *** 0.0994 * 0.1656   0.1272   
11 29/04/14 CAAR -0.3374   -0.2281   -0.0118   -0.6789   -0.9873   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.4909   0.6167   0.8876   0.3450   0.2723   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0263 ** 0.1863   0.3690   0.0299 ** 0.0066 *** 
12 17/07/14 CAAR 3.5496   4.2108   4.7114   1.4835   3.3290   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.0391 ** 0.0415 ** 0.0130 ** 0.0475 ** 0.0125 ** 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0027 *** 0.0108 ** 0.0017 *** 
13 08/08/14 CAAR -2.7103   -3.4215   -4.1628   -0.4877   -2.0389   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.5001   0.3368   0.4305   0.9626   0.0973 * 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0002 *** 0.3198   0.0005 *** 
 43 
14 04/09/14 CAAR -0.3599   -0.2766   0.1141   -0.6200   -1.2332   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.5537   0.7003   0.8908   0.1923   0.3750   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0095 *** 0.1160   0.5509   0.0131 ** 0.0208 ** 
15 27/10/14 CAAR -0.7472   -0.9566   -1.1961   -0.0928   0.1700   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.7222   0.6905   0.6363   0.8692   0.9760   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.1657   0.3394   0.5786   0.2611   0.1847   
16 30/10/14 CAAR 0.9903   0.9705   0.5428   1.0523   2.6410   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.4443   0.5136   0.7737   0.3183   0.1221   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0019 *** 0.0329 ** 0.2982   0.0110 ** 0.0018 *** 
17 04/11/14 CAAR 1.9200   2.1638   3.2107   1.1579   0.7762   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.5454   0.7059   0.7344   0.1947   0.6373   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0017 *** 0.0310 ** 0.2912   0.0107 ** 0.0112 ** 
Description: The table reports the CAARs in the CDS market (in bps) in response to the key announcement on the BU. It indicates 
whether the event is related to the supervision, resolution or CA. It shows the CAARs for (i) the entire sample of banks (ALL); (ii) 
banks located in euro area countries (EU_EZ); (iii) banks located in euro area peripheral countries (GIIPS); (iv) banks located in 
EU non-euro area countries (EU_NONEZ); and (v) G-SIBs. Significance is tested according to the adjusted version of the Boehmer 
et al. (1991) test (adjBMP) by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) and the generalized sign test by Cowan (1992) (GENSIGN).  












































Table 15: Stock market reaction to the key BU announcements (1-day event window)  
# Date   ALL   EU_EZ   GIIPS   EU_NONEZ   G-SIBS   
1 12/09/12 CAAR 1.7239   2.4520   2.7911   -0.1567   -0.3718   
  
Supervision 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.1549   0.1594   0.1959   0.7541   0.3305   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.4310   0.1188   0.0906 * 0.4490   0.1551   
2 13/12/12 CAAR 0.8591   1.3634   0.9276   -0.4588   -0.1654   
  
Supervision 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.2809   0.2017   0.1144   0.2059   0.7358   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0736 * 0.0007 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0631 * 0.6788   
3 12/09/13 CAAR 0.2310   0.4267   0.5943   -0.0759   -0.2514   
  
Supervision 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.5863   0.9145   0.5331   0.8107   0.4465   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.6652   0.4266   0.1801   0.8481   0.8185   
4 23/10/13 CAAR -0.7310   -1.1238   -1.9176   0.2493   0.2873   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.1491   0.1171   0.0188 ** 0.5578   0.0514 * 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.8967   0.3882   0.0053 *** 0.1574   0.1237   
5 08/11/13 CAAR 0.2937   0.5254   -0.0090   -0.1255   -0.2266   
  
Resolution 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.5992   0.9236   0.9538   0.6788   0.5173   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.8906   0.6313   0.6016   0.4322   0.7459   
6 03/02/14 CAAR -0.1598   -0.3109   0.3342   0.0662   0.4643   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.9710   0.8104   0.5965   0.8272   0.0511 * 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0270 ** 0.0566 * 0.1615   0.3712   0.1242   
7 07/02/14 CAAR 0.1981   0.3014   0.3693   -0.0979   0.4242   
  
Supervision 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.3100   0.2389   0.3470   0.8582   0.0861 * 
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.8270   0.1177   0.3136   0.0145 ** 0.3515   
8 11/03/14 CAAR 0.9008   1.3490   1.1673   -0.3538   0.1282   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.5146   0.4758   0.4267   0.6285   0.9543   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.6436   0.8057   0.5110   0.8159   0.7711   
9 20/03/14 CAAR -0.2892   -0.1130   -0.1787   -0.8511   0.3444   
  
Resolution 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.4278   0.9913   0.9531   0.2176   0.2566   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.1310   0.4725   0.5834   0.0421 ** 0.1308   
10 25/04/14 CAAR -0.1318   -0.1341   -0.1490   -0.0871   0.1420   
  
Supervision 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.8758   0.8678   0.9864   0.9107   0.4817   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.8200   0.9927   0.6762   0.4740   0.3539   
11 29/04/14 CAAR -0.2338   -0.4106   -0.4551   0.2550   -0.3184   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.3034   0.1337   0.1926   0.2752   0.2341   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.0478 ** 0.0233 ** 0.0398 ** 0.8601   0.1369   
12 17/07/14 CAAR 0.1236   0.1352   0.0863   0.0529   -0.0553   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.4849   0.4894   0.8621   0.9560   0.9386   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.9081   0.8291   0.7802   0.3854   0.4011   
13 08/08/14 CAAR -0.2444   -0.0556   -0.2188   -0.6372   -0.0058   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.7832   0.3808   0.5520   0.1588   0.9622   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.4763   0.6018   0.9106   0.0465 ** 0.8094   
 45 
14 04/09/14 CAAR 0.4863   0.8745   1.1290   -0.5138   -0.0323   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.6419   0.1965   0.1767   0.0407 ** 0.9946   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.1372   0.0005 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0102 ** 0.3803   
15 27/10/14 CAAR -0.4742   -0.9363   -1.9292   0.6207   0.2685   
  Comprehensive 
Assessment 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.4160   0.9956   0.5452   0.0898 * 0.3225   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.7756   0.5201   0.2955   0.1760   0.7228   
16 30/10/14 CAAR -0.6773   -1.3210   -2.3291   1.0814   0.1846   
  
Supervision 
p-value (adjBMP) 0.7770   0.1659   0.0600 * 0.0001 
**
* 0.6433   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.9991   0.0482 ** 0.0071 *** 0.0004 
**
* 0.8020   
17 04/11/14 CAAR 0.0927   0.0120   -0.2813   0.4103   -0.0357   
  Supervision p-value (adjBMP) 0.5457   0.2771   0.2125   0.0079 
**
* 0.6062   
  p-value (GENSIGN) 0.9752   0.1782   0.0222 ** 0.0140 ** 0.3405   
Description: The table reports the CAARs in the stock market (in %) in response to the key announcement on the BU. It indicates 
whether the event is related to the supervision, resolution or CA. It shows the CAARs for (i) the entire sample of banks (ALL); (ii) 
banks located in euro area countries (EU_EZ); (iii) banks located in euro area peripheral countries (GIIPS); (iv) banks located in 
EU non-euro area countries (EU_NONEZ); and (v) G-SIBs. Significance is tested according to the adjusted version of the Boehmer 
et al. (1991) test (adjBMP) by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) and the generalized sign test by Cowan (1992) (GENSIGN).  
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
